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Intro duC tIo n
In recent years, the problem of base erosion and profit shifting (beps) by multi-
national corporations has entered the public consciousness as a potentially important 
impediment to tax collections. The purpose of this article is to identify the nature 
of beps, consider empirical evidence of its magnitude, and evaluate proposed policy 
responses.
There is considerable evidence that multinational firms arrange their affairs in a 
tax-sensitive manner, from which it is easy—indeed, perhaps a little too easy—to 
infer that beps is a serious problem. There are journalistic accounts of apparently 
spectacular international tax-avoidance schemes used by multinational corpora-
tions, though these stories commonly omit or misrepresent important legal and 
economic elements, making it difficult to know what, if any, conclusion to draw 
from them. On a serious level, the us Joint Committee on Taxation was recently 
charged by the us Congress with identifying extreme examples of beps among us 
corporate taxpayers, and produced a report1 that included six such examples. And 
 * Of the university of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and the National bureau of economic Research 
(email: jrhines@umich.edu).
 1 united states, staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Present Law and Background Related to 
Possible Income Shifting and Transfer Pricing, JCX-37-10 (Washington, DC: Joint Committee on 
Taxation, July 20, 2010).
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statistical studies consistently indicate that multinational corporations report higher 
profit rates in low-tax jurisdictions than in high-tax jurisdictions, a pattern that is 
consistent with beps.
How important is the problem of beps from the standpoint of tax collections? 
The statistical evidence consistently indicates that the impact on tax revenues is only 
modest in magnitude. some of the latest evidence2 suggests that the semi-elasticity 
of income reporting is roughly 0.4, which means that a corporation that is located in 
a country with a 25 percent tax rate, and that has the opportunity to reallocate some 
of its taxable income to a country with a 15 percent tax rate, will typically arrange 
its financial and other affairs to reallocate 4 percent of its income to the lower-rate 
country. Other, rather more persuasive, evidence suggests that multinational firms 
earning profits in high-tax countries find ways to reallocate 2 percent of those prof-
its to low-tax foreign jurisdictions.3 For various reasons to be discussed, even these 
2 or 4 percent figures probably overstate the potential tax revenue to be had by 
eradicating beps, but on its own terms the potential tax revenue from 2 or 4 percent 
of pre-tax incomes of multinational corporations would make an extremely modest 
contribution to the government finances of most countries. The average member 
country of the Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development (OeCD) 
in 2011 raised 8.8 percent of its total tax revenue from taxes on corporate profits, 
only a portion of which represented taxes on multinational corporations,4 2 percent 
of which would be two-tenths of 1 percent of tax revenue. even if one were to 
double, or quintuple, this figure, it would amount to less than 1 percent of tax rev-
enue. From this standpoint, it appears that even a complete solution to the problem 
of beps, were one available and implementable, would have little direct impact on 
government finances.
That the level of concern expressed about the problem of beps is inconsistent 
with the implications of the available statistical evidence suggests either that the 
problem has been vastly overstated in popular discussion or that there is something 
amiss with the body of careful empirical work on this issue. Further consideration 
of even simple pieces of evidence points again, however, in the direction of beps being 
a much smaller problem than is commonly appreciated. The fact that governments 
 2 see Theresa Lohse and Nadine Riedel, Do Transfer Pricing Laws Limit International Income 
Shifting? Evidence from European Multinationals, Oxford university Centre for business Taxation 
Working paper no. 13/07 (Oxford: university of Oxford, saïd business school, Centre for 
business Taxation, september 2013); and Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature, Illinois public Law and 
Legal Theory Research paper series no. 14-23 (urbana-Champaign: university of Illinois, 
College of Law, December 2013). Dharmapala’s survey of the literature indicates that more 
recent studies tend to report smaller magnitudes of beps.
 3 Dhammika Dharmapala and Nadine Riedel, “earnings shocks and Tax-Motivated Income-
shifting: evidence from european Multinationals” (2013) 97:1 Journal of Public Economics 95-107.
 4 see Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development, OECD.StatExtracts (http://
stats.oecd.org).
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of high-tax-rate countries collect considerable revenue from taxing the profits of 
their resident multinational corporations itself indicates that tax avoidance is not as 
easy or cost-effective as some fear that it is. If firms were able to arrange their affairs 
in ways that would easily reallocate pre-tax income earned in high-tax locations to 
alternative locations with zero or very low tax rates, then most would surely do so, and 
even those corporations without an international business presence would quickly 
establish operations in low-tax foreign locations in order to reduce their tax obliga-
tions. That corporations persist in paying taxes to governments of high-tax countries 
does not reflect lack of imagination or insufficient profit motive; it reflects the fact 
that enforcement makes tax avoidance difficult and costly.
Further evidence is available from the location of foreign business activities. 
studies consistently find that multinational firms locate more employment, prop-
erty, plant, and equipment in low-tax locations, and less in high-tax locations, than 
the structures of these economies would ordinarily warrant. This business activity 
pattern is itself a form of base erosion from the standpoint of high-tax countries, 
albeit of a rather mundane form, since it is hardly surprising that high tax rates dis-
courage business activity, whereas low tax rates attract it. From the standpoint of 
profit shifting, however, this pattern makes it clear that firms are unable to reallo-
cate pre-tax income with impunity. If it were easy to reallocate taxable income, 
there would be no benefit to locating real business activity in a low-tax country. The 
profit-maximizing strategy would be to locate business activity wherever it generates 
the highest pre-tax profits, and use financial or other means to reallocate taxable in-
come to an affiliate located in a zero-tax location. It would be a mistake to let tax rates 
influence where pre-tax profits are actually earned, since doing so reduces the amount 
that is ultimately destined to be reported as income by the affiliate in a tax haven. In 
fact, this is not what firms do: the evidence consistently indicates that multinational 
firms tend to locate greater real business activity in countries with low tax rates than 
would otherwise be expected. This is consistent with maximizing after-tax profits 
only if it is difficult to shift pre-tax income.
Finally, there is evidence from the use of tax haven affiliates by multinational 
corporations. The tax havens are the countries with the lowest tax rates, and so are 
the destinations of choice (if one has unfettered choice) for profits to be reallocated 
from high-tax countries. Among large us multinational firms from 1982 to 1999, 
only 38 percent had tax haven affiliates,5 and among German multinational firms 
from 2002 to 2008, only 20 percent had tax haven affiliates.6 The majority of us and 
German firms obviously did not reallocate taxable income to tax havens, since they 
had no method of doing so, given the absence of legal presence in those countries. 
 5 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., “The Demand for Tax Haven Operations” 
(2006) 90:3 Journal of Public Economics 513-31.
 6 Anna Gumpert, James R. Hines Jr., and Monika schnitzer, The Use of Tax Havens in Exemption 
Regimes, NbeR Working paper no. 17644 (Cambridge, MA: National bureau of economic 
Research, December 2011).
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The most noteworthy feature of this evidence is that there is nothing that prevents 
a us or German multinational firm from establishing a tax haven affiliate. The rea-
son not to do so is that it is not worth it—and the reason it is not worth it is that it 
is too difficult or costly to reallocate taxable income from high-tax countries to tax 
haven countries.
Consequently, one is left with a puzzle. There is clearly scope for beps to reduce 
tax liabilities, and ample evidence that multinational firms arrange their affairs in 
a tax-sensitive manner. The empirical puzzle is why there is not more tax avoidance 
than appears to be the case. The sections that follow review some of the available 
evidence, which may deepen rather than resolve the puzzle.
FIn a nCIng o F  MultIn atIo n a l Co rp o r atIo ns
successful beps entails locating taxable income in low-tax jurisdictions and deduct-
ible expenses in high-tax jurisdictions. The most straightforward way to be able to 
report earning taxable income in low-tax jurisdictions is to concentrate economic 
activity there. To a certain degree this occurs as a matter of course, since, all other 
things being equal, high tax rates discourage economic activity by reducing after-tax 
rewards. As a result, economic activity tends to flourish in low-tax environments to 
a greater degree than in high-tax environments, even in the absence of multinational 
firms and opportunities to substitute low-tax activities for high-tax activities. In 
addition, there is the opportunity for such substitution, so one should expect there 
to be disproportionate income production in low-tax environments. And the avail-
able evidence consistently indicates that there is much more multinational activity 
in low-tax locations than would ordinarily be predicted on the basis of other eco-
nomic characteristics.7
Concern over beps is usually directed not at the location of economic activities, 
but at the location of taxable income contingent on economic activities. Taxable 
income is the difference between revenues and expenses, and corporate financing 
operations can offer relatively straightforward methods of placing expenses where 
they generate the largest tax benefits. Corporations can be financed with either debt 
or equity, debt offering the advantage that interest payments are generally deduct-
ible in calculating taxable income, whereas dividend payments to shareholders are 
 7 see, for example, James R. Hines Jr. and eric M. Rice, “Fiscal paradise: Foreign Tax Havens 
and American business” (1994) 109:1 Quarterly Journal of Economics 149-82; James R. Hines Jr., 
“Altered states: Taxes and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment in America” (1996) 86:5 
American Economic Review 1076-94; Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert, and T. scott Newlon, 
“Has u.s. Investment Abroad become More sensitive to Tax Rates?” in James R. Hines Jr., ed., 
International Taxation and Multinational Activity (Chicago: university of Chicago press, 2001), 
9-32; James R. Hines Jr., “Tax sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries,” ibid., 
39-66; Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., “Foreign Direct Investment in a 
World of Multiple Taxes” (2004) 88:12 Journal of Public Economics 2727-44; and salvador 
barrios, Harry Huizinga, Luc Laeven, and Gaëtan Nicodème, “International Taxation and 
Multinational Firm Location Decisions” (2012) 96:11-12 Journal of Public Economics 946-58.
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typically not deductible. since the benefits of interest deductibility rise with tax 
rates, it follows that firms in higher-tax locations should be expected to use greater 
amounts of debt than do firms in lower-tax locations, whether or not they substitute 
borrowing in one location for borrowing in another. In addition, the ability of 
multinational firms to choose the location of borrowing gives even greater scope for 
arranging financing in order to locate interest deductions where they will be most 
valuable.
Governments of high-tax countries are well aware of the benefits of interest 
deductibility, and have implemented several measures that limit the ability of tax-
payers to benefit from strategic debt-location choices. These measures include thin 
capitalization rules that deny interest deductions once interest expenses are deemed 
excessive by some (typically rather crude) measure; interest expense allocation rules 
that require domestic-based multinational companies to allocate a portion of domes-
tic interest expense against foreign income, thereby effectively reducing available 
foreign tax credits; and controlled foreign corporation rules that subject to home-
country taxation certain interest income received by foreign affiliates. Taxpayers 
often attempt to plan around these rules, but doing so can be costly, a constraint 
that may explain why multinational firms do not make even more use of borrowing 
arrangements to reduce their tax obligations.
There is considerable evidence that borrowing by multinational firms is sensitive 
to local tax rates. Desai et al.8 offer evidence that among the foreign affiliates of us 
multinationals from 1982 to 1994, 10 percent higher local tax rates were associated 
with 2.8 percent higher debt:asset ratios. Huizinga et al.9 document a similar pat-
tern among the foreign affiliates of european multinationals from 1994 to 2003. 
buettner et al.10 find that, as expected, thin capitalization rules dampen the effect of 
tax-rate differences on the borrowing behaviour of european multinationals from 
1996 to 2004. Froot and Hines11 consider the impact of the us Tax Reform Act of 
1986 on borrowing by us multinational firms. The 1986 Act required us firms to 
allocate a portion of domestic interest expense against foreign income, effectively 
removing the tax benefit of domestic interest deductions for firms with excess foreign 
tax credits; the evidence indicates that the affected firms responded by significantly 
reducing their domestic borrowing. Tax rates appear to influence many aspects of a 
 8 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., “A Multinational perspective on Capital 
structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets” (2004) 59:6 Journal of Finance 2451-87.
 9 Harry Huizinga, Luc Laeven, and Gaëtan Nicodème, “Capital structure and International 
Debt shifting” (2008) 88:1 Journal of Financial Economics 80-118.
 10 Thiess buettner, Michael Overesch, ulrich schreiber, and Georg Wamser, “The Impact of 
Thin-Capitalization Rules on the Capital structure of Multinational Firms” (2012) 96:11-12 
Journal of Public Economics 930-38.
 11 Kenneth A. Froot and James R. Hines Jr., “Interest Allocation Rules, Financing patterns, and 
the Operations of u.s. Multinationals,” in Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines Jr., and R. Glenn 
Hubbard, eds., The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations (Chicago: university of 
Chicago press, 1995), 277-307.
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multinational firm’s borrowing behaviour, including implicit borrowing that takes 
the form of delaying payment for purchases.12
How should one think about the role of corporate borrowing in beps activity by 
multinational firms? since governments generally permit firms to deduct interest 
payments in calculating taxable income, these policies acknowledge—at least tacitly—
that permitting a tax deduction for some portion of interest expense is acceptable, 
maybe even desirable. The beps concern presumably lies with the abusive use of 
debt contracts, which is a subset of overall use. In this context, it is perhaps striking 
that multinational firms do not make better strategic use of debt than they do—that 
interest deductions are not even more concentrated in high-tax countries.13 Coun-
tries have the ability to impose thin capitalization rules and other methods of limiting 
the strategic use of debt, and it may be that the rules currently in place account 
for the limited extent to which multinational firms are able to use interest deduc-
tions to reduce their taxable incomes in high-tax countries. These rules could be 
further strengthened, but this would come at the cost of discouraging corporate 
activity, reducing the associated employment and other economic benefits that it 
brings. Consequently, the financing portion of beps may represent reasoned trade-
offs on the part of taxing authorities around the world.
pro FIt  re a llo C atIo n
International tax avoidance takes many forms, of which tax-motivated cross-border 
loans represent just one. Other methods of tax avoidance include making tax-sensitive 
adjustments to the transfer prices used to record transactions between related parties, 
corporate reorganizations designed to relocate corporate residence to attractive tax 
jurisdictions, and careful timing of income repatriation to reduce the cost of home-
country taxation of foreign income.
Multinational firms generally have incentives to reallocate taxable income from 
high-tax locations to low-tax locations, since $1 of pre-tax income is obviously more 
valuable if lightly taxed than if heavily taxed. Firms located in countries that exempt 
foreign income from taxation face the clearest incentives to relocate taxable income. 
suppose, for example, that a firm located in a country with a 30 percent tax rate 
earns $100 of income at home, where it would normally be subject to tax at 30 per-
cent, but the firm has the opportunity to attribute $50 of that income to its foreign 
affiliate in a location with a 20 percent tax rate. If the home country does not tax 
foreign income, then the reallocation reduces domestic tax liabilities by $15 and 
 12 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., Trade Credit and Taxes, NbeR Working 
paper no. 18107 (Cambridge, MA: National bureau of economic Research, May 2012).
 13 Others have noted the puzzle that corporations generally could benefit from the tax savings 
associated with greater use of debt, but for some reason persist in issuing large amounts of 
equity. see, for example, John R. Graham, “How big Are the Tax benefits of Debt?” (2000) 
55:5 Journal of Finance 1901-41.
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increases foreign tax liabilities by $10, for a net saving of $5. Income reallocation is 
unlikely to be costless, but if the tax saving of $5 exceeds the after-tax cost of income 
reallocation, then it will be in the interest of the firm to move taxable income from 
the high-tax to the low-tax location.
How would the firm in this example reallocate taxable income? In addition to 
adjusting the volume and location of borrowing, it is possible for firms to adjust the 
pricing of intercompany transactions. An excessively transparent method of doing 
so would be to sell a paper clip from the affiliate in the 20 percent tax-rate location 
to the parent company in the 30 percent tax-rate location, charging a price of $1 mil-
lion. This transaction would create a tax deduction of $1 million in the home country 
and taxable income of $1 million in the foreign country, thereby reducing total 
global tax obligations. Cognizant of these incentives, governments have adopted 
arm’s-length pricing rules dictating that, for tax purposes, the prices used for inter-
company transactions must be the same as those that would have been chosen by 
unrelated parties transacting at arm’s length. While the arm’s-length pricing stan-
dard addresses the problem of $1 million paper clips, there is widespread concern 
that the difficulty of applying the standard to many ordinary cases, not to mention 
complex transactions involving sophisticated financial instruments or intangible 
property such as patents and trademarks, leaves ample opportunity for tax avoidance. 
Governments, particularly those of high-tax countries, are perfectly well aware of 
the potential of transfer price manipulation to erode tax collections, and devote 
considerable resources to enforcing the arm’s-length standard, though it is an open 
question just how effective they are in doing so.
empirical studies of tax avoidance fall into two general categories. The first cat-
egory consists of studies that compare reported profit rates in countries with differing 
tax rates. The idea, of course, is to measure the extent to which unusually high rates 
of profit are reported in low-tax jurisdictions. This immediately raises the question of 
what rate of profit should be expected in the absence of tax-motivated income re-
allocation, and this question has multiple components. There is no presumption 
that profits measured as a fraction of sales, assets, or some other metric of business 
activity should be the same in all foreign jurisdictions. As a general matter, one 
might expect pre-tax profit rates to be lower in low-tax jurisdictions than in high-tax 
jurisdictions, since after-tax marginal profits of capital will often be lower; but even 
this presumption confuses marginal and average conditions, and is based on steady-
state properties of models that may not be valid for large numbers of taxpayers.
The second category of empirical study in this area investigates observable aspects 
of specific activities undertaken by taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities, as well as 
reactions to changing conditions. These observable aspects include suspicious prices 
of transactions between related parties, or greater numbers of these transactions; 
apparently tax-motivated trade imbalances between related parties; relocation of 
corporate tax homes to tax-advantaged jurisdictions; location of valuable intangible 
property in low-tax jurisdictions; and dividend repatriation (or the alternative of 
deferring dividend repatriation) by foreign affiliates of firms located in countries 
that impose taxes on repatriated profits.
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The available evidence points consistently in the direction of tax-rate differences 
exerting significant influence over the behaviour of multinational firms. Reported 
profit rates are higher in low-tax jurisdictions than in high-tax jurisdictions, and 
firms appear to devote significant efforts to activities designed to facilitate income 
reallocation.
What are the costs of tax avoidance? The costs include administrative and compli-
ance costs, among them the potential penalties that might be imposed by governments 
that maintain that taxpayers fail to report taxable income accurately. but surely the 
largest cost is that of business activity undertaken to facilitate income reallocation. 
profit reallocation technology entails establishing business operations in locations 
that firms would otherwise not choose but for the opportunity that is thereby created 
to reallocate taxable income.
The first generation of modern empirical studies of income reallocation14 con-
sidered the determinants of average profit rates. In theory, low tax rates should be 
associated with high pre-tax profit rates if firms allocate taxable income to avoid tax 
liabilities. Hines and Rice15 find that us multinational firms in 1982 reported sig-
nificantly higher (pre-tax) profits in low-tax countries than in high-tax countries, 
after controlling for business inputs of labour and capital, and after controlling for 
measurable aspects of local economic conditions. There have been many subse-
quent studies of this variety, most using firm-level data that have many advantages 
over the aggregate data for us firms used by Grubert and Mutti16 and Hines and 
Rice17 (and more recently by Clausing).18 Huizinga and Laeven19 likewise find that 
reported profit rates are lower in high-tax countries, though their estimated effect—
that a 10 percent higher tax rate is associated with 13 percent reduced reported 
profitability of european firms—is somewhat smaller than the effect reported by 
Hines and Rice.20 Lohse and Riedel21 calculate the effect of tax-rate differences on 
reported profitability of european firms from 1999 to 2009, controlling more com-
prehensively for the economic effects of affiliate location, and find profit reallocation 
 14 For example, Harry Grubert and John Mutti, “Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer pricing in 
Multinational Corporate Decision Making” (1991) 68:2 Review of Economics and Statistics 
285-93; and Hines and Rice, supra note 7.
 15 Hines and Rice, supra note 7.
 16 Grubert and Mutti, supra note 14.
 17 Hines and Rice, supra note 7.
 18 Kimberly A. Clausing, “Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax policy” (2009) 62:4 
National Tax Journal 703-25.
 19 Harry Huizinga and Luc Laeven, “International profit shifting Within Multinationals: 
A Multi-Country perspective” (2008) 92:5-6 Journal of Public Economics 1164-82.
 20 Hines and Rice, supra note 7.
 21 Lohse and Riedel, supra note 2.
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effects that are smaller than those reported by Huizinga and Laeven: 10 percent 
higher tax rates are associated with 4 percent reduced reported profitability in Lohse 
and Riedel’s data. Other recent studies, reviewed in Dharmapala,22 come to similar 
conclusions.
An important recent contribution to this literature is Dharmapala and Riedel,23 
which looks at the propagation of profits throughout a multinational firm. The idea 
behind this study is that, in the absence of profit-shifting behaviour, a change in the 
economic environment that affects a parent company’s profitability should have no 
systematic effect on the reported profitability of the company’s foreign affiliates 
located in low-tax jurisdictions. Consequently, if it is possible to identify economic 
changes that affect parent company profitability without directly affecting the prof-
itability of foreign affiliates, the extent of profit reallocation can be measured by the 
contemporaneous effect of the economic changes on reported profitability of tax 
haven affiliates. For example, a parent company that mines coal might become more 
profitable if the world price of coal rises, but if the company’s shipping affiliate in a 
tax haven also becomes more profitable, it starts to look as though profits are being 
reallocated from the parent company. Dharmapala and Riedel report that the prof-
itability of affiliates in low-tax countries does appear to be influenced by events that 
change the profitability of parent companies, but that the effect is quite small, with 
something in the neighbourhood of 2 percent, or possibly as much as 4 percent, of 
parent profits being reallocated to low-tax affiliates.
There is considerable supporting evidence of methods used by multinational 
firms to avoid reporting profits in high-tax countries. Clausing24 finds that the 
foreign affiliates of us multinational firms report trade imbalances with their us 
parent companies that look suspiciously tax-motivated: affiliates in countries with 
10 percent lower tax rates run 4.4 percent higher trade surpluses with their parent 
companies. In a later study, Clausing25 offers other suggestive evidence of possible 
mispricing of commodities traded between related parties, noting systematic differ-
ences between prices reported by us companies in trade with related and unrelated 
parties. Dischinger and Riedel26 provide evidence that european multinational firms 
are more likely to hold intellectual property in low-tax than in high-tax locations, and 
this may facilitate profit reallocation. Further evidence of tax-motivated behaviour 
 22 Dharmapala, supra note 2.
 23 Dharmapala and Riedel, supra note 3.
 24 Kimberly A. Clausing, “The Impact of Transfer pricing on Intrafirm Trade,” in International 
Taxation and Multinational Activity, supra note 7, 173-94.
 25 Kimberly A. Clausing, “Tax-Motivated Transfer pricing and us Intrafirm Trade prices” (2003) 
87:9-10 Journal of Public Economics 2207-23.
 26 Matthias Dischinger and Nadine Riedel, “Corporate Taxes and the Location of Intangible 
Assets Within Multinational Firms” (2011) 95:7-8 Journal of Public Economics 691-707.
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appears in the tax-sensitive extent to which us firms repatriate profits from foreign 
locations27 and the relocation of corporate homes for tax purposes.28
There is little doubt that multinational firms are motivated to avoid taxes and are 
aware of the available methods. And there is evidence of a limited degree of inter-
national tax avoidance—but the question is why there is not more, given the motive 
and opportunity. That there is considerable scrutiny of transactions between related 
parties, with stiff potential penalties for non-compliance, is surely part of the an-
swer; but another part may be that the actions necessary to facilitate tax avoidance 
are sufficiently costly and cumbersome that it is simply not worth it in return for the 
modest potential tax savings.
p o lIC y  a ltern atI v e s
Concern over the potential for beps has prompted extensive reconsideration of the 
international regime by which company profits are taxed. One radical reform would 
be to replace the current system of determining the location of profits earned by 
multinational firms with a formulary method of assigning profits to jurisdictions 
based on factors such as employment, sales, and capital in place. Advocates argue that 
these factors are less capable of being manipulated than are prices used in transactions 
between related parties. some of the difficulties with formulary apportionment have 
been widely noted, including the ability of firms to undertake transactions that 
manipulate the location of formulary factors; furthermore, the inaccuracy of em-
ployment, sales, and capital in place as predictors of firm profitability29 raises the 
possibility that the use of formulary methods will introduce its own inaccuracy, 
arbitrariness, and resulting inefficiency into the taxation of multinational firms.
There is a separate issue, that any international reform that successfully reduces 
the magnitude of beps will almost surely put downward pressure on business tax 
rates around the world. Countries currently choose their corporate tax rates in an 
environment in which multinational firms are able to engage in beps and thereby 
avoid a portion of what would otherwise be their tax obligations. Reducing beps 
increases tax burdens but does little, if anything, to reduce the competitive pressures 
that countries face in attempting to attract and foster business activity; as a result, 
tax rates are likely to decline—possibly by quite a bit. beps effectively permits high-tax 
 27 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., “Repatriation Taxes and Dividend 
Distortions” (2001) 54:4 National Tax Journal 829-51; and Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz 
Foley, and Kristin J. Forbes, “Watch What I Do, Not What I say: The unintended 
Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act” (2011) 66:3 Journal of Finance 753-87.
 28 Mihir A. Desai and James R. Hines Jr., “expectations and expatriations: Tracing the Causes 
and Consequences of Corporate Inversions” (2002) 55:3 National Tax Journal 409-40; and 
Johannes Voget, “Relocation of Headquarters and International Taxation” (2011) 95:9-10 
Journal of Public Economics 1067-81.
 29 see James R. Hines Jr., “Income Misattribution under Formula Apportionment” (2010) 54:1 
European Economic Review 108-20.
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countries to differentiate among corporate taxpayers, imposing heavier tax burdens 
on domestic firms that may constitute a less elastic tax base than that provided by 
multinational firms. If beps were eradicated and multinational firms were subjected 
to exactly the same tax burden as domestic firms, many high-tax countries might 
face serious declines in their multinational business sector, and feel the need to re-
spond by reducing taxes on everyone. Whether this would ultimately result in 
greater or lower total tax collections is an open question.
The problem of beps easily catches the imagination, particularly given the atten-
tion that has attached to several distasteful anecdotes of crass tax avoidance. The 
empirical evidence is quite consistent with beps being a real phenomenon, but one 
that is notably small in magnitude and unlikely to undermine the sustainability of 
government finance. There are undoubtedly some potential policy reforms that 
would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international tax enforcement, but 
the danger looms that the international community in its desire to combat beps 
might introduce reforms that could significantly undermine economic efficiency or 
stimulate tax competition, and ultimately reduce government tax collections. It is 
questionable whether radical reforms are justified by the very modest size of the 
beps problem. Accordingly, it is to be hoped that any actions undertaken by the 
international community will reflect thoughtful consideration of the magnitude of 
beps and the costs and benefits of possible reforms.

